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TO REVEAL OR
CONCEAL?—AN ISP’S
DILEMMA

Presenting a New “Anonymous Public Concern
Test” for Evaluating ISP Subpoenas in Online
Defamation Suits
Cayce Myers
3/01/2011

This article proposes a new test called the “Anonymous Public Concern Test” which incorporates public
concern analysis in enforcing Internet Service Provider [ISP] subpoenas in online defamation suits.
Anonymous speech is an important aspect of First Amendment rights that warrants protection. Current
tests used by courts to analyze whether to enforce ISP subpoenas are either too pro-plaintiff or too prodefendant. The article’s proposed “Anonymous Public Concern Test” is the best approach in dealing with
ISP subpoenas because it protects both anonymous speech and preserves online defamation plaintiffs’
rights.
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Patrick Cahill was a local City Councilman in the town of Smyrna, Delaware.1 Beginning in
2004 Cahill began to openly break with the Smyrna Mayor Mark Schaeffer on a number of local
issues.2 These differences between Councilman Cahill and Mayor Schaeffer did not go
unnoticed within the Smyrna community. Beginning in September of 2004 several people began
posting comments online on the “Smyrna/Clayton issues blog” about the tension between
Councilman Cahill and the Mayor.3 These posts were all anonymous and were posted under the
usernames “Proud Citizen;” “Saw it All;” “Me too;” and “Screwed U All.”4 Their comments
ranged from criticism of Cahill’s ability to serve as a local councilman to commentary on
Cahill’s marriage and personal life.5 One anonymous posting commented on Cahill’s aptitude
and ability as a City Councilman.6 The anonymous blogger wrote:
“If only Councilman Cahill was able to display the same leadership skills, energy and
enthusiasm toward the revitalization and growth of the fine town of Smyrna as Mayor
Schaeffer has demonstrated!...Cahill has devoted all of his energy to being a divisive
impediment to any kind of cooperative movement. Anyone who has spent any amount of
time with Cahill would be keenly aware of such character flaws, not to mention an
obvious mental deterioration. Cahill is a prime example of failed leadership—his
eventual ousting is exactly what Smyrna needs….”7
Other postings were less political, and took the forms of personal attacks on Cahill and his wife
Julia.8 An anonymous blogger wrote:

Cahill v. Jon Doe No. One, 879 A.2d 943, 946 (Del. Super. 2005) rev’d, John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451
(Del. 2005).
2
Cahill, 879 A.2d at 946.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 946-48.
6
Id. at 946.
7
Id. at 946.
8
Id. at 946-947
1
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“I have to say that I would be embarrassed to be associated with the scum of the earth Pat
and Julia [Cahill]. Everybody in town talks about how freaky they are. Not to mention
the fact that Julia has screwed…or at least tried to screw half the people in town! That
just goes to show that she’s nothing but a “bottom of the barrel scum sucking whore”!!
[sic] While I am thinking about it why don’t Pat and Julia take their boat and shove it up
their asses…I hear Pat likes that kind of stuff.”9
Other bloggers went further accusing Councilman Cahill’s wife of being a prostitute, stating that
she had left him, and that she regularly committed adultery.10 One blogger went so far as to
write that Cahill and his wife “couldn’t have sex because he [Councilman Cahill] has Hepititis
[sic] C. Now she’s [Julia Cahill] living in Dover with her BIG blond girlfriend and they both go
out to the bars most nights trying to pick up guys.”11
The Cahills eventually brought suit against the online bloggers for defamation.12 The
Cahills did not know the true identity of these bloggers so they had to request their identities
from Independent Newspapers, Inc., who maintained the blog, and later Comcast, who was the
Internet Service Provider (ISP).13 At this point victims of online defamation must petition courts
to force ISPs to tell plaintiffs who these anonymous posters are.14 This places courts in the
difficult position of having to decide between telling defamation plaintiffs the true identity of a
defendant verses protecting an anonymous online speaker’s right to remain unidentified.15
This example of these online comments concerning the Cahills illustrates the competing
interests courts’ face in enforcing ISP subpoenas in online defamation suits. While some
Id. at 946-947.
Id. at 947.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 945.
13
Id. at 948.
14
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, *1 (Va.Cir. Ct. 2000).
15
Ashely Kissenger, Katherine Larson, Untangling the Legal Labyrinth; Protections for Anonymous Online Speech,
13 No. 9 J. Internet L. 1, 16 (2010).
9

10
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postings online are legitimate commentary that rises to the level of highly protected political
speech; other postings are simply defamation. The varying types of online postings coupled with
the importance courts give to anonymous speech present an interesting and difficult decision for
courts. While anonymous speech has been considered to be an extremely important aspect of
free speech, anonymous defamation presents a major problem with online forums such as blogs.
Even though there is no universally accepted approach to analyze ISP subpoenas, several
courts have created their own tests.16 Creating a fair test is difficult because courts must
simultaneously uphold the integrity of anonymous speech while affording defamation plaintiffs
the right to know the identity of defendants. Because of the tension of these incompatible
interests the current tests either lean heavily in favor of plaintiffs or defendants. Three cases
represent the approaches and difficulties courts have had in developing a standard method to
evaluate ISP subpoenas.17 This tension is illustrated in the pro-plaintiff test outlined in the
Virginia Circuit Court case of In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. (AOL)18
and the pro-defendant tests from New Jersey and Delaware in the cases of Dendrite Intern. Inc.
v. John Doe No. 3 (Dendrite) and John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, (Cahill).19 None of these tests
achieve the goal of providing an effective method for plaintiffs to discover the true identity of
online defamers without violating online bloggers’ right to remain anonymous.
This article presents a new test that protects anonymous speech while striking a fair
balance between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights. The “Anonymous Public Concern Test”
incorporates the history of protection of anonymous speech and addresses the critiques of various
Id. at 17.
Clay Calvert, Kayla Gutierrex, Karla D. Kennedy, Kara Carnley Murrhee, David Doe v. Goliath, Inc.: Judicial
Ferment in 2009 For Business Plaintiffs Seeking the Identities of Anonymous Online Speakers, 43 J. Marshall L.
Rev. 1, 15, 15-16 (2009).
18
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 (Va.Cir.Ct. 2000) rev’d on other
grounds, America Online Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 261 Va. 350, 542 S.E.2d 377 (2001).
19
Dendrite Intern., Inc. v. John Doe, No. 3, 342 N.J. Super. 134 (2001); John Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451
(Del. 2005).
16
17
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pro-plaintiff, pro-defendant, and hybrid tests employed by courts today. This article presents a
new test that utilizes an initial “matter of public concern” test that is later coupled with a proplaintiff analysis to evaluate when ISP subpoenas should be enforced.20
This article explores anonymous speech, ISP subpoenas, and proposes a new approach to
evaluate ISP subpoenas in three sections. Section I explores the history and jurisprudence
surrounding anonymous speech and association within the First Amendment. Section II
examines and critiques the various pro-plaintiff, pro-defendant, and hybrid tests used by courts to
determine when to enforce ISP subpoenas. Last, in Section III the article proposes a new
“Anonymous Public Concern Test” as the best method for courts to use in order to determine
when to enforce an ISP subpoena. From these sections this article shows the importance of
anonymous speech and illustrates the failure of current tests in evaluating ISP subpoenas. This
article presents the new “Anonymous Public Concern Test” which is a new test that seeks to
remedy the pro-plaintiff and pro-defendant biases of current tests while preserving the right to
speak anonymously. This is accomplished by incorporating the U.S. Supreme Court’s standards
used in workplace speech cases along with current tests used in online defamation.21
Incorporating workplace speech analysis into this new test makes logical sense because both
issues involve a type of proportional balancing between conflicting interests of speakers’ rights
against other interests, e.g. workplace harmony and plaintiffs’ rights. This novel approach of this
new test provides the best analysis for protecting online speakers’ rights preserving defamation
plaintiffs’ right to know the identity of defendants. Using this new approach not only borrows
from established case law, but it provides an operationalized framework for balancing these
competing rights of plaintiffs and defendants.
20
21

Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 1734 (1968).
Id.; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (1983).
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I.

Anonymity and the First Amendment
Anonymous speech has been consistently viewed as part of the First Amendment by the

U.S. Supreme Court. However, the issue of anonymous speech in online defamation suits has
never been directly addressed by the Court. Anonymity has been analyzed by the Court in both
written speech22 and association.23 While these two areas of anonymity are different, both
illustrate that anonymity within American speech and politics has a rich history and a high value
to the Supreme Court.24
A. Anonymous Writings
The U.S. Supreme Court has evaluated regulations on anonymous speech using exacting
scrutiny.25 Exacting scrutiny analysis requires the statute restricting anonymous speech to be
“narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”26 This high level of scrutiny can be
justified by the importance anonymous speech plays within American society and social
movements. Commenting on the importance of anonymous speech within history Justice Hugo
Black wrote:
“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important
role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all.” 27
This view of the important role anonymous speech has in political discourse was a major
underpinning in Justice Black’s majority opinion in Talley v. California (Talley), which struck
Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 80 S.Ct. 536 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct
1511 (1995).
23
NAACP v. Ala., 367 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163 (1958).
24
Talley, 362 U.S. 60; McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
25
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 345-347.
26
Id. at 347.
27
Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
22
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down a local ordinance requiring handbills to contain the author’s name and address.28 In Talley
the City of Los Angeles prosecuted a man who produced and distributed anonymous handbills
that advocated the boycott of businesses that sold certain products by companies who practiced
discriminatory employment practices.29 Los Angeles argued that their ordinance “is aimed at the
prevention of ‘fraud, deceit, false advertising, negligent use of works, obscenity, and libel,’ in
that it will aid in the detection of those responsible for spreading material of that character.”30
However, the majority of the Court rejected this justification citing that they recently held
anonymity was an important factor in political association.31 Justice Black pointed to the “fear
of reprisal” as a major justification for allowing both anonymous association and speech.32
Justice Black wrote, “It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most
constructive purposes.”33
Anonymous speech was again addressed by the Supreme Court in 1995 in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission (McIntyre).34 Like the majority in Talley, the majority in McIntyre
struck down an Ohio statute that banned anonymous pamphlets concerning political messages.35
In McIntyre a woman distributed an anonymous pamphlet that criticized the local school board

Id. at 60-66.
Id. at 61. The handbill asked readers to sign and become a member of the National Consumers Mobilization.
Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 61 (1960). One the handbill contained the statement “I believe that every man should
have an equal opportunity for employment no matter what his race, religion, or place of birth.” Id. at 61.
30
Id. at 66.
31
Id. at 65 (citing Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S.Ct. 412 (1960)); NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449
(1958).
32
Id. at 65. Justice Black cited several examples from Puritan pamphleteers in seventeenth century England to the
Federalist Papers in the newly formed United States as illustrations of the great political importance of anonymous
speech. Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
33
Id. The dissent of Justices Clark, Frankfurter and Whittaker cited that the First Amendment did not give a
freedom for anonymous speech. Talley v. Cal., 362 U.S. 60, 70 (1960). The dissenting Justices also pointed out
that the reasons given by Los Angeles for justifying this ordinance were “compelling.” Id. at 67. The dissenters
also noted that there are other state statutes that banned anonymous publishing concerning political candidates and
that bans on anonymous publication “expressed the overwhelming public policy of the Nation.” Id. at 70.
34
McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334.
35
Id.; Talley, 362 U.S. 60.
28
29
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concerning school taxes.36 Instead of signing her name as required by the statute she instead
signed the pamphlet “Concerned Parents and Tax Payers.”37 Citing Justice Black’s opinion in
Talley, Justice Stevens’ majority opinion highlighted the importance of anonymous speech in
politics.38 Justice Stevens wrote that anonymous writings have a special place in history and
literature.39 The majority held that even though there may be some public interest in the identity
of an anonymous speaker it is ultimately the anonymous speaker’s decision to reveal
themselves.40
Justice Stevens held the speech banned under the Ohio statute in McIntyre was more narrowed
than the speech banned in Talley.41 However, the speech in McIntyre was political speech
restricted by a content based statute which is given exacting scrutiny analysis under the First
Amendment.42
Part of the majority’s rationale for striking down the Ohio law banning anonymous
political pamphleteering is that anonymity itself is an important means of communication.43
Justice Stevens recognized the importance of anonymous speech writing, “On occasion, quite
apart from any threat of persecution, an advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive
if her readers are unaware of her identity.”44 This idea is predicated on the belief that anonymity
divorces the message from the author so readers “will not prejudge her [the author’s] message
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336.
Id. at 337.
38
Id. at 341-345.
39
Id. at 341-342. Justice Stevens listed a wide variety of authors and political figures whose work was published
anonymously. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 362 U.S. 334, 342 footnote 4 (1995). These authors and
political figures included Charles Dickens, Benjamin Franklin, Voltaire, George Sand, Mark Twain, Charles Lamb,
and Shakespeare. Id.
40
Id. at 341.
41
Id. at 344.
42
Id. at 345-347. Ohio argued that its state interest was two-fold. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 362 U.S.
334, 348 (1995). The Ohio statute served to stop “fraudulent and libelous statements” and ensured voters would
receive “relevant information.” Id. at 348. The Court rejected these two justifications and found the statute
unconstitutional. Id. at 348-351; 357.
43
Id. at 342.
44
Id. at 342.
36
37
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simply because they do like its proponent.”45 Justice Stevens also placed great importance of the
role of anonymity in politics.46 Citing the example of the secret ballot he wrote that anonymity is
an important political mechanism that allows a person to voice his or her views without fear.47
Justice Thomas’ concurrence in McIntyre reiterated this point stating that the right to
speak anonymously was inextricably intertwined with the Framers’ idea of the First
Amendment.48 Examining eighteenth century America, Justice Thomas held that the type of
pamphleteering found in McIntyre was exactly what the Framers were trying to protect under the
freedom of the press.49 Commenting on the Framers’ use of anonymous speech during the
American Revolution, Justice Thomas wrote, “the historical evidence indicates that Founding-era
Americans opposed attempts to require that anonymous authors reveal their identities on the
ground that forced disclosure violated the ‘freedom of the press.’”50
Like Justice Black’s majority opinion in Talley, Justice Thomas’ concurrence in
McIntyre gives a wide variety of examples of anonymous speech in early America.51 Beginning
with the famous 1735 Zenger trial, Justice Thomas explained how much of the anti-British
political movement in America stemmed from anonymous speech.52 Justice Thomas
particularly pointed to the debates surrounding the ratification of the Constitution and the use of
anonymous speech by Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike.53 The major concept of Justice
Thomas’ analysis of anonymous speech is that he believes the exacting scrutiny analysis is

Id.
Id. at 343.
47
Id. at 343.
48
Id. at 359.
49
Id. at 360.
50
Id. at 361.
51
McIntyre, 362 U.S. at 361-370; Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-66.
52
McIntyre, 362 U.S. at 361-367. Peter Zenger was an early American printer prosecuted for sedition for not
releasing the names of anonymous authors who were writing criticism of the colonial British government of New
York. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995). At a jury trial Zenger was acquitted. Id.
53
Id. at 368.
45
46
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ultimately unnecessary because the foundational construction of the First Amendment protects
anonymous speech.54
B. Anonymous Association
In addition to anonymous speech the U.S. Supreme Court has also recognized anonymous
association rights.55 As with anonymous speech, the Court has recognized the importance of
anonymous association in context with political activity. The right of association is related to the
rights of anonymous speech; in both Talley and McIntyre there are references to Supreme Court
cases on the right to nondisclosure of the names of members in political organizations.56 Similar
issues arise in association disclosure cases as do in anonymous speech cases. In NAACP v.
Alabama the U.S. Supreme Court’s per curium opinion pointed out the various issues of
mandatory disclosure of memberships in a political organization.57 The Court held that an
Alabama Circuit Court could not force the NAACP to submit a list of all of their statewide
members even though Alabama business incorporation law required such a disclosure.58

Id. at 370. Justice Scalia’s dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist discredits Justice Thomas’ historical
justification for protection of anonymous speech under the freedom of the press. McIntyre v. Ohio Election
Commn., 514 U.S. 334, 371-373 (1995). The dissent also focuses on the historical underpinning of laws designed to
reduce anonymous speech. Id. at 375-376. Justice Scalia’s writes that the ban on anonymous speech is justifiable
because of the importance of protecting the elections and candidates from false statements. Id. at 378-380.
55
NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
56
Talley, 362 U.S. at 66 (citing NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449 (1958) as holding that states may not always force
organizations to reveal the identities of their members); 362 U.S. at 66 (Justice Harlan’s concurrence references
NAACP v. Ala., 357 U.S. 449 (1958) in the discussion of applying strict scrutiny to freedom of speech and
association); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 347 (1976)(per curiam) as holding
that the constitution has an important role in political campaigns); McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 353 footnote 14
(discussing a state’s interest in identifying those engaging in political speech through donations); McIntyre, 514 U.S.
at 355-356 (discussing the difference between mandatory disclosure of identities of campaign contributions to the
overly broad Ohio statute in McIntyre requiring all political communication to contain the author’s identity).
57
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462-463.
58
Id. at 459-466. Alabama state law required all foreign businesses to submit a charter to the state. NAACP v. Ala.,
357 U.S. 449, 451-452 (1958). The NAACP did not submit a charter for its newly formed field office and the State
of Alabama petitioned for a court order to restrict the NAACP from operating their Alabama field office. Id. at 452.
During this lawsuit the Alabama court requested information from the NAACP which included membership rosters
with members’ identities. Id. at 453-454.
54
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Applying a strict scrutiny analysis the Court held that Alabama’s requirements of disclosure
were a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.59
The Court also discussed the importance of anonymity in regard to association. Justice
Harlan held that speech and association were related and that associations result in “effective
advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones.”60 Speech
and association are viewed as part of the same “liberty” interests “assured by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”61
The Supreme Court held that the NAACP did not seek to be exempt from Alabama
laws.62 Rather, the Court held mandatory disclosure of NAACP membership lists were an
infringement of the NAACP’s members’ freedom of association.63 Alabama’s argument for
obtaining these membership lists were not related to the political message of the NAACP.64
Alabama sought the membership lists in order to determine whether the NAACP is a foreign
corporation that had to register with the state.65 The Court found this reasoning unconvincing
especially since the NAACP had complied with all of the document requests of the Circuit Court
except the membership lists.66
Justice Harlan commented on the negative impact such compelled disclosure would have
writing, “inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be
indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses
dissident beliefs.”67 The Court also cited the reasoning behind the NAACP’s reluctance to

Id. at 460-461, 466.
Id. at 460.
61
Id. at 460.
62
Id. at 463.
63
Id. at 462.
64
Id. at 464.
65
Id. at 464.
66
Id. at 464.
67
Id. at 462.
59
60
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release their Alabama membership lists.68 Justice Harlan wrote, “Petitioner [NAACP] has made
an uncontroverted showing that on past occasions revelation of the identity of its rank-and-file
members has exposed these members to economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of
physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.”69 The Court was also concerned
about the potential chilling effect this forced revelation could have on political association.70
There was a fear that compelled disclosure of membership in the Alabama NAACP would not
only drive current members out of the organization, but potential members would be afraid to
join because of the negative collateral consequences of disclosed membership.71
The association right of individuals was revisited by the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley
v. Valeo (Buckley).72 Buckley concerned many laws the Federal Elections Commission (FEC)
had promulgated concerning campaign finance.73 The Supreme Court once again held that
government laws concerning association rights of were reviewed using strict scrutiny.74
However, the Court made a point to note that this scrutiny level did not mean that all government
regulations of association are automatically struck down.75 The majority held that association
was a fundamental right, but that there was no “absolute” right to associate in “political
activities.”76
The majority also recognized the importance of anonymity within political association.77
The majority in Buckley recognized that the government must meet “exacting scrutiny” in order

Id. at 462.
Id. at 462.
70
Id. at 462-463.
71
Id. at 463.
72
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 612 (1976).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 75.
75
Id. at 25 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 567, 93 S.Ct. 2880, 2891 (1973)).
76
Id.
77
Id. at 64-74.
68
69
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to compel political groups to disclose the identities of their members.78 “Exacting scrutiny” is
interpreted as requiring the government to have “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’
between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed.”79 The Supreme
Court emphasized that a “mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest” was not
enough to overcome this exacting scrutiny standard.80 The Court justified this high level of
scrutiny stating that “compelled disclosure has the potential for substantially infringing the
exercise of First Amendment rights.”81
Justice Thomas recently discussed his ideas concerning the importance of anonymous
association in his concurring opinion in Citizens United v. FEC (Citizens United).82 Citizens
United, like Buckley, concerned campaign finance laws.83 Justice Thomas’ concurrence in
Citizens United discussed the importance of anonymous speech and reiterated his idea first
articulated in McIntyre that anonymous speech was intrinsic to the First Amendment.84 Citing
examples of the negative treatment political donors have received because of their political
contributions; Justice Thomas emphasized the importance of anonymity within the political
world.85

Id. at 64, 64-65.
Id. at 64 (citing Pollard v. Roberts, 283 F.Supp. 248, 257 (E.D. Ark.) aff’d, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S.Ct. 47 (1968)). In
Buckley the government gave three reasons for the compelling state interests requiring the disclosure of campaign
contributors’ identities. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976). The interests were (1) voters needed to know
where campaign contributions came from in order to evaluate the candidates; (2) mandatory disclosure reduces
misconduct on the part of the candidates; and (3) disclosure permits for a more detailed account of contributions so
misconduct can be found. Id. Ultimately the Supreme Court found all three of these reasons to qualify as
“substantial government interests.” Id. at 68.
80
Id. at 64. The Supreme Court noted that laws that require the disclosure of associations’ members can arise both
as “direct government action” and as “unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct.” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 65 (1976).
81
Id. at 66.
82
Citizens United v. FEC, __ U.S. __, 130 S.Ct. 876, 980 (2010).
83
Id.; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1.
84
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 980; McIntyre, 362 U.S. at 370.
85
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 980.
78
79
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One example of political retribution concerned the controversy over California’s
Proposition 8 which banned gay marriage.86 The mandatory disclosure requirements of all
contributors to either side of the issue resulted in particularly dangerous harassment of those who
were in favor of banning gay marriage.87 Justice Thomas pointed to this harassment as an
illustration of why anonymity is important.88 He wrote, “The success of such intimidation tactics
has apparently spawned a cottage industry that uses forcibly disclosed donor information to preempt citizens’ exercise of their First Amendment rights [original emphasis].”89 In examining the
intimidation in the Proposition 8 debate and the 2008 presidential election Justice Thomas held
that compelled identification of political donors should not be required.90 Justice Thomas wrote
that mandatory disclosure of political contributions ultimately reduces the amount of people
contributing to political campaigns and thus reduces individuals’ free speech rights.91
II.

Online Defamation, Anonymous Speech, and ISP Subpoenas
The invention and growth of the Internet has created many issues within the First

Amendment. The United States Supreme Court recognized the “phenomenal” growth of the
Internet.92 The Court held in Reno v. ACLU that government regulation of speech on the
Internet “is more likely to interfere with the free exchange of ideas than to encourage it.”93
Internet anonymity has been viewed as highly important; one California Court of Appeals held
“the use of a pseudonymous screen name offers a safe outlet for the user to experiment with
Id.
Id. In one instance gay marriage advocates posted the names and addresses of supporters of Proposition 8 on a
website. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct. 876, 980 (2010). Other instances of harassment included damaging
property and personal threats directed toward Proposition 8 supporters. Id. at 980.
88
Id. at 981.
89
Id. at 981.
90
Id.
91
Id. Justice Thomas cites an example in which a man did not want to contribute to a political campaign because he
feared if his candidate lost the winner would seek retribution against him. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S.Ct 876,
981 (2010).
92
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885, 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
93
Id. at 885.
86
87
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novel ideas, express unorthodox political views, or criticize corporate or individual behavior
without fear of intimidation or reprisal.”94 However, with the advent of the Internet and blogs
came the problem online anonymous libel. As one court noted, “When vigorous criticism
descends into defamation …constitutional protection is no longer available.”95 The issue of
online defamation is a byproduct of the type of Internet communication which oftentimes is “a
vehicle for emotional catharsis.”96 Since these bloggers and authors of web postings are
anonymous, defamation plaintiffs must first file a John Doe lawsuit and try to make the ISP
divulge the identity of the anonymous author before they can proceed further with the lawsuit.97
This demand places ISPs in a precarious situation because they must comply with court
orders but wish to make money and gain popularity with users.98 Telling defamation plaintiffs
the identity of their customers make ISPs do something that is antithetical to their business
interests.99 The Virginia Circuit Court in AOL recognized that if courts made ISPs release the
names of their users “one could reasonably predict that AOL subscribers would look to AOL’s
competitors for anonymity.”100
Likewise Courts have grappled with striking a balance between free speech rights of
anonymous online authors and defamation plaintiffs’ rights to sue.101 With that pervasive
problem courts across the United States have devised tests that can be characterized as either
pro-plaintiff or pro-defendant.102 The Maryland Court of Appeals summarized this tension
holding “we are cognizant that setting too low a threshold would limit free speech on the
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Internet, while setting too high a threshold could unjustifiably inhibit a plaintiff with a
meritorious defamation claim from pursuit of that cause of action.”103 However, one scholar
noted that “when expressive speech is at issue, as in defamation cases, courts tend to apply a
high burden test.”104
A. Pro-Plaintiff Tests
The genesis of tests for ISP subpoenas began with the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California in 1999 in Columbia Ins. v. Seescandy.com [Seescandy].105 In Seescandy
the District Court required a plaintiffs’ to satisfy a four part test in order to obtain the identity of
an anonymous online user.106 Seescandy was decided in the early days of the Internet and
concerned a trademark infringement action.107 An attempt to create a test to evaluate subpoenas
in online defamation cases came in 2000 by the Circuit Court of Virginia in the case of In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online (AOL).108 In that case five anonymous bloggers
wrote several detrimental comments in an online chat room about a publically traded
company.109 The company argued that the statements were untrue and brought a defamation suit
against the anonymous bloggers.110 The company requested the ISP AOL to voluntarily release
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the anonymous bloggers identities, but AOL refused.111 The company then sought a court order
to compel AOL to release the names of the anonymous bloggers.112
AOL argued that requiring the release of the bloggers’ names “unreasonably impairs the First
Amendment rights of the John Does to speak anonymously on the Internet.”113 The Virginia
Circuit Court recognized that forcing an ISP to reveal the names of its customers presented a
problem for ISPs as well.114 The Court said, “There can be no reasonable doubt that a disclosure
of the names of those who support the activities of the appellants could have no result other than
to injuriously affect the effort of appellants [AOL] to obtain financial support in promoting their
aims and purposes.”115 Recognizing the potential business implications of forcing AOL to reveal
the identity of its users the court said, “The subpoena duces tecum at issue potentially could have
an oppressive effect on AOL.”116
The court in AOL also recognized the important rights associated with anonymous speech.117
Discussing the history of anonymous speech in America the court held, “This right [of
anonymous speech] arises from a long tradition of American advocates speaking anonymously
though pseudonyms, such as James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay.”118 This right
to anonymity was further linked to the Internet in that user anonymity is a large part of the
Internet itself.119 The court held, “To fail to recognize that the First Amendment right to speak
anonymously should be extended to communications of the Internet would require this Court to
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ignore either United States Supreme Court precedent of the realities of speech in the twenty-first
century.”120
Despite this recognition of the role of anonymous speech and the Internet, the Virginia
Circuit Court found “the right to speak anonymously is not absolute.”121 The court further held
that there should be some balancing between “the right to communicate anonymously” and “the
need to assure that those persons who choose to abuse the opportunities presented by this
medium can be made to answer for such transgressions.”122 In order to balance these interests
the Virginia Circuit Court devised a three-part analysis in deciding when to enforce an ISP
subpoena.123 The court held that an ISP must:
“provide information concerning the identity of a subscriber (1) when the court is satisfied
by the pleading or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the party requesting the subpoena
has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in
the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) the subpoenaed identity information is centrally
needed to advance that claim.”124
Ultimately the Virginia Court held that the allegedly defamed company met this test and that
AOL had to comply with the subpoena to release the names of the anonymous bloggers.125
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Courts have referred to this AOL test as a “‘good faith’ standard.”126 Another court referred to
the test in AOL as “functionally similar to that put forth in Seescandy.Com.”127
This AOL approach was later adapted by a Delaware trial court in Cahill v. John Doe
Number One.128 Although the Delaware Supreme Court later reversed the Delaware Superior
Court in Cahill, the Superior Court decision provides valuable insights and explanations of the
AOL standard.129 The anonymous speech in the Cahill involved anonymous bloggers posting
negative comments about a local city councilman.130 Like the Virginia Court in AOL, the
Delaware Superior Court in Cahill recognized the anonymous speech rights for Internet users.131
The court said, “This extension [of rights of anonymous speakers on the Internet] is appropriate
given that the internet readily ‘facilitates the rich diverse, and far ranging exchange of ideas.’”132
However, the trial court also pointed out that serious problems arise with anonymous Internet
speech because Internet anonymity suffers from a large lack of “accountability” on the part of
the speakers.133 The court pointed to a lack of an “editorial filter” and that compared to other
mediums anonymous Internet speech was less controlled.134 The Delaware trial court feared that
plaintiffs unable to identify their defamers would be “in the untenable situation of sitting idly by,
without any recourse, as his [the plaintiff’s] reputation quite literally is destroyed.”135
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Given these problems of anonymous Internet speech in relation to defamation the Delaware
Superior Court in Cahill praised the standard articulated in AOL.136 The court held “the ‘good
faith’ showing required by America Online [AOL] is not insubstantial and more than adequately
protects against the abuse of the subpoena power by an overzealous defamation plaintiff.”137
The trial court did have issues with the lack of definition to the “good faith basis” requirement of
part two of the AOL test.138 The lack of definition of “good faith basis” led the trial court to use
other methods to determine the phrase’s meaning.139 The trial court determined whether a case
was “brought in good faith” by looking at the plaintiff’s pleadings and motions.140 This “good
faith” was met when plaintiffs demonstrate “a legitimate basis for claiming defamation in the
context of their particular circumstances.”141 The court emphasized that plaintiffs “need not
establish per se defamation.”142
The Delaware Superior Court further defined the requirements of the second and third step of
the AOL standard.143 AOL’s second step is redefined by the Delaware trial court as “the
identifying information sought by the subpoena must relate directly and materially to an essential
aspect of the claim.”144 This requirement of AOL did not permit a plaintiff to obtain the identity
of an anonymous Internet speaker on a “secondary claim.”145

Id. at 953-954.
Id. at 953.
138
Id. at 953 footnote 48. The second part of the AOL test is “(2) that the party requesting the subpoena has a
legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit
was filed in.” In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online Inc., 2000 WL 1210372 *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
139
Cahill, 879 A.2d. at 953. The Cahill court states applying the AOL “good faith” test used definitions of Delaware
Superior Court Civil Rule 11 which uses a “subjective good faith test” as opposed to “require[ing] the plaintiff to
plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie basis for relief.” Cahill v. John Doe No. 1, 879 A.2d 943, 953
(Super. Crt. Del. 2005).
140
Id. at 954.
141
Id. at 954.
142
Id. at 954.
143
Id. at 955-956.
144
Id. at 955.
145
Id. at 955 (citing John Doe v. 2TheMart.com, 140 F.Supp 2d 1088, 1096 (W.D. Wash. 2001)).
136
137

19

The third step in AOL, as defined by the Delaware trial court, requires plaintiffs to show that
“they cannot discover the identity of John Doe No. 1 by other means.”146 The Delaware Superior
Court interpreted this requirement to mean that “the plaintiff must first attempt to locate the
identifying information from other sources or demonstrate that it would be futile to undertake
this effort.”147 The court stressed that just because the simplest way to obtain an anonymous
online speaker’s identity is through an ISP does not mean that the plaintiff needs to petition an
ISP first without pursuing other avenues of investigation.148 Ultimately the Delaware Superior
Court in Cahill held that the plaintiffs met the AOL requirements and enforced a subpoena
against the ISP for the identities of the anonymous bloggers in their defamation case.149
The approach in AOL was sharply criticized by the New Jersey Superior Court in Dendrite v.
John Doe No. 3 which addressed a similar factual situation to that in AOL.150 The Court in
Dendrite held the AOL standard “depart[s] from traditionally-applied legal standards in
analyzing the appropriateness of such disclosure in light of the First Amendment
implications.”151 The D.C. Court of Appeals also criticized AOL stating the standard put forth
by the Virginia Circuit Court “insufficiently protects a defendant’s anonymity.”152 The D.C.
Court feared AOL’s test “strip[ed] defendants of anonymity in situations where there is no
substantial evidence of wrongdoing.”153 Likewise, the Maryland Court of Appeals rejected
AOL’s test stating that it lacked standards in its requirement for plaintiffs to put forth a good
faith test because this standard “varies from state to state and, sometimes, court to court.”154 A
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California Appeals Court described the AOL test as “a low threshold for disclosure….It offers no
practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiff’s good faith and leaves the speaker with little
protection.”155
B. Pro-Defendant Tests
As online defamation cases appeared in other states, courts began to develop new tests for
enforcing ISP subpoenas. Two states, New Jersey and Delaware, expressly rejected the proplaintiff approach and created pro-defendant tests known as the Dendrite test and the Cahill
test.156 In essence these pro-defendant tests utilize, either expressly or implicitly, a balancing of
defamation plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights.157 This balancing is not operationalized and courts
are somewhat left to their own discretion of deciding when a plaintiff’s interest in knowing the
identity of an online defendant outweighs the defendant’s anonymous speech rights.158 In
Dendrite International, Inc. v. John Doe No. 3159 the New Jersey trial court refused to enforce a
subpoena against Yahoo! to disclose the identity of an anonymous online blogger who posted
derogatory messages concerning Dendrite Incorporation.160 The New Jersey Superior Court
ultimately denied Dendrite Incorporation’s appeal for enforcing the subpoena against Yahoo! on
the grounds that the company failed to meet a defamation claim’s harm element.161
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The New Jersey court created a test that defamation plaintiffs must meet in order to enforce a
subpoena against an ISP.162 This particular test involves a four-part analysis.163 The test is:
1) Plaintiffs must “undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the
subject of a subpoena or application for an order of disclosure, and withhold action to
afford the fictitiously-named defendants a reasonable opportunity to file and serve
opposition to the application.”164
2) Plaintiffs must “set forth the exact statements” at issue that “constitutes actionable
speech.”165
3) Plaintiffs must “set forth a pima facie cause of action against the fictitiously-named
anonymous defendants.”166 This requirement is interpreted as requiring the plaintiff to
“produce sufficient evidence supporting each element of its cause of action…prior to a
court ordering the disclosure of the identity of the unnamed defendant.”167
4) After these first three elements are met the Court will then “balance the defendant’s First
Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the strength of the prima facie case
presented and the necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity.”168
The court stated that this test was applied “case-by case” and that the “guiding principle” of the
court’s test was a “proper balancing of the equities and rights at issue.”169
The Court in Dendrite created this four-part test because they recognized the importance
of anonymous speech on the Internet.170 Citing Seescandy the Dendrite Court analyzed the
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unique situation the Internet creates in regard to anonymous speakers.171 The federal court in
Seescandy foresaw that the Internet created a situation where an individual could “commit
certain tortious acts, such as defamation, copyright infringement, and trademark infringement,
entirely online.”172 Despite this concern in Seescandy, the Dendrite decision recognized that
courts must look to speakers’ First Amendment rights as well as defamation plaintiffs’ right to
sue.173
In 2005 the Supreme Court of Delaware analyzed and incorporated parts of the Dendrite
test in their new Cahill test.174 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s adoption
of the AOL standard holding that it was “concerned that setting the standard [for revealing
anonymous online speakers] too low will chill potential posters from exercising their First
Amendment right to speak anonymously.”175 A plaintiff’s ability to force an ISP to reveal the
identity of an anonymous speaker is “a very important form of relief.”176 The Court feared that
revealing an anonymous speaker could potentially subject the speaker to a whole host of negative
collateral consequences or what the court called “extra-judicial self-help remedies.”177 In fact,
there was some concern by the Court that some plaintiffs’ brought defamation suits solely for the
purpose of “unmask[ing] the identities of anonymous critics.”178
The Delaware Supreme Court in Cahill also pointed out that the facts in their case were
different than those in cases like AOL.179 They noted that in Cahill the anonymous speech
concerned a politician and his role as a city councilman, rather than a business and its practices
Id. at 148-149.
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like that found in AOL.180 Given the Cahill court’s uneasiness with forcing ISPs to reveal the
identities of their users the court adopted a variation of the Dendrite test.181 However, the Court
explicitly noted that they were not following the entire Dendrite standard.182 Rather, the Cahill
test is described as a “summary judgment standard.”183 This standard was used to “strike the
balance between a defamation plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation and a defendant’s right to
exercise free speech anonymously.”184
The Supreme Court of Delaware pointed out specific parts of the Dendrite test that it was
expressly abandoning.185 The Court held “we do not think that the second and fourth prongs of
the Dendrite test are necessary.”186 The second prong of Dendrite “require[s] the plaintiff to
identify and set forth the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous poster
that…constitutes anonymous speech.”187 The Supreme Court of Delaware viewed this prong as
unnecessary in light of using a “summary judgment inquiry” which would essentially require this
identification of statements by the plaintiff.188 The fourth prong of Dendrite holds “the court
must balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free speech against the
strength of the prima facie case presented.”189 This requirement was also viewed as unnecessary
by the Delaware Supreme Court because “the summary judgment test is itself the balance.”190 In
sum the Cahill test for determining when an ISP must release the identity of an anonymous user
to a defamation plaintiff is defined as being “a modified Dendrite standard consisting only of
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Dendrite requirements one and three: the plaintiff must make reasonable efforts to notify the
defendant and must satisfy the summary judgment standard.”191 Using this new standard the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the statements made about Robert Cahill and his wife were
opinion and “therefore, incapable of a defamatory meaning” thus failing to “satisfy the summary
judgment standard.”192
One criticism of these pro-defendant tests is that they have, according to one scholar,
“made the outcome of lawsuits for online defamation difficult to predict.”193 The original trial
court in Cahill sharply criticized the Dendrite test.194 The Cahill trial court agreed with the
plaintiff’s characterization of the Dendrite test as being a standard that “requires too much.”195
The Dendrite test was seen as requiring a plaintiff to “answer what is tantamount to a motion to
dismiss before the plaintiff can learn the identity of the speaker he claims has defamed him.”196
The court further criticized Dendrite holding “under Dendrite, the plaintiff is put to the nearly
impossible task of demonstrating as a matter of law that a publication is defamatory before he
serves his compliant or even knows the identity of the defendant(s).”197
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Other criticisms of the Dendrite test center on the balancing requirement.198 The Illinois
Appellate Court held that there was a logical flaw in balancing the anonymous speech interests
of online speakers verses the plaintiff’s prima facie case.199 The Court held that since by this
stage of the Dendrite test the plaintiff had already made out a prima facie case for defamation it
was illogical to balance the interests of the two parties since there is “no first-amendment right to
defame.”200
Cahill’s pro-defendant summary judgment standard has also been criticized. The
Maryland Court of Appeals held that Cahill test is “setting the bar too high…to require plaintiffs
to meet a summary judgment standard…would undermine personal accountability and the search
for truth, by requiring claimants to essentially prove their case before even knowing who the
commentator was.”201 In Krinsky a California appellate court also noted that the summary
judgment standard was bad in general application because there is no uniform standard for
summary judgment.202
The Cahill test also has been attacked because of the amount of specificity a plaintiff
must have in their pleadings to overcome a summary judgment standard.203 The District Court of
Massachusetts held that “bare assertions in an affidavit are not adequate to defeat summary
judgment, as the plaintiff must adduce specific facts.”204 The U.S. District Court of Connecticut
sharply criticized the Cahill standard as being “potentially confusing and also difficult for a
plaintiff to satisfy when she has been unable to conduct any discovery at this juncture.”205 The
Connecticut District Court even went as far to say that overcoming the Cahill standard may be
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“impossible to meet…for any cause of action which required evidence within the control of the
defendant.”206 At least one Court held that the summary judgment standard in Cahill did not
even adequately address the Court’s concern of chilled speech effects.207 The Wisconsin
Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss standard was better than the Cahill summary
judgment standard because it better protects the anonymity of the defendants.208
Despite the criticism of the pro-defendant stances of Dendrite and Cahill, many courts
have adopted these standards for reviewing ISP subpoenas. As recent as July 2010 the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington adopted a variation of the Dendrite
standard holding that a plaintiff must meet the requirements of notice; presentation of a prima
facie case; and proving the importance of the defendant’s identity to “the plaintiff’s case.”209
Once these standards were met the plaintiff’s case would undergo Dendrite balancing.210 Citing
the importance of anonymous speech verses plaintiff’s rights, the U.S. District Court of
Connecticut held that the prima facie standard announced in Dendrite “strikes the most
appropriate balance between the First Amendment rights of the defendant and the interest in the
plaintiff of pursuing their claims.”211
Cahill’s summary judgment standard has also received praise from various courts. The
Court of Appeals of Texas adopted the Cahill test holding that the summary judgment standard
was best because it protected anonymous speech.212 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
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Circuit also held in 2010 that Cahill was “the most exacting standard” and that a District Court
did not err in applying it.213
C. Hybrid Tests
Despite the pervasiveness of the AOL, Dendrite, and Cahill tests, some courts have
created their own tests to analyze anonymous speaker subpoenas.214 Like other pro-defendant
tests these approaches provide a balancing, or at least some analysis, of plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ interests.215 One U.S. District Court extrapolated anonymous speaker subpoena
standards in defamation cases to issues concerning illegal Internet file sharing.216 In Sony Music
Entertainment v. Does the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York created a
four-part test to determine when a court should enforce a subpoena on an ISP to reveal an
anonymous user.217 The four-part test requires plaintiffs to prove:
1) “prima facie case of copyright infringement;”218
2) “specificity of the discovery request;”219
3) “absence of alternative means to obtain subpoenaed information;”220
4) “ central need for subpoenaed information;”221
5) Analysis of the “defendant’s expectation of privacy.”222
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This approach has gained some popularity with a New York state trial court which adopted this
standard in 2005; the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts in 2008; and in the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina in 2009.223
Other courts have used a variation of the Dendrite test.224 In the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of California used a two-part Dendrite variation in which a plaintiff had to
prove (1) “support a pima facie case on all elements” and a (2) balancing of the plaintiff’s rights
verses the defendant’s anonymous speech rights.225 The U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut adopted a hybrid of Dendrite standards in 2008.226 The Court incorporated
Dendrite’s prima facie case standard and balancing test in order to determine if an ISP had to
release the names of anonymous users who allegedly committed defamation.227
Some courts have also used a variation of the Cahill summary judgment standard.228 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals created a five-step test using the Cahill summary
judgment standard.229 This five-part test included elements of notice and giving the defendant
enough time to respond to the subpoena.230 The Court of Appeals of Arizona also used a Cahill
test coupled with Dendrite balancing.231 The Court held that while Cahill’s summary judgment
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standard is appropriate it does not allow courts to analyze the importance of anonymous
speech.232 Given this criticism of Cahill the Arizona court added the Dendrite balancing test to
Cahill’s summary judgment analysis.233 The Court held that this balancing was important for
courts because there were “a vast array of factually distinct cases likely to involve anonymous
speech.”234
Still other courts have created their own standards for evaluating ISP subpoenas.235 The
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana found that none of the common
approaches to enforcing an ISP subpoena “satisfactory.”236 The Court criticized other efforts to
protect the identity of anonymous speakers since plaintiffs could conceivably learn the identity
of John Doe defendants by means other than a subpoena.237 The District Court created a test that
required plaintiffs to have “a showing of at least a reasonable probability or a reasonable
possibility of recovery on the defamation claim.”238 This test has actually received one scholar’s
support.239 Jessica Chilton wrote that the test devised by the Louisiana District Court “provides
the best method for resolving discovery question in John Doe defamation cases while also laying
the groundwork for a comparison with other standards promulgated by the courts.”240
The issue with all of these hybrid tests is that they, like all pro-defendant tests, provide no
real context in which to strike the appropriate balance between plaintiffs’ and defendants’ rights.
Additionally, these tests leave too much subjectivity to the court in applying these tests. Using
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these approaches presents is a real situation where the outcome of a suit would depend largely
upon the judge’s independent viewpoints in making the decision. Even the test articulated by the
U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana provides no real protection for
anonymous speech.241 That court’s analysis of the success of a plaintiff’s claim allows for the
same undefined subjective reasoning of other hybrid tests.242
III.

A New Approach to ISP Subpoenas: Introducing the “Anonymous Public Concern
Test”

Given the shortcomings of pro-plaintiff, pro-defendant, and hybrid tests a new test is needed
to evaluate when an ISP should release the name of a speaker in an online defamation suit. The
major shortcoming in all of the current tests is striking the right balance between plaintiffs and
defendants. Current tests are either too pro-plaintiff or too pro-defendant, which gives both sides
an unfair advantage depending on what court they are in. All of the tests fail to give the proper
protection to anonymous speech and instead focus too much on the defamation claim. A new
test needs to be devised that gives the right amount of protection for anonymous speech.
However, the difficulty is that this test does not need to be so encompassing that defamation
becomes protected as well. One scholar noted that while there is little uniformity within current
ISP subpoena tests one thing is consistent—“courts have developed standards for unmasking
anonymous internet speakers without regard for the content of the speech at issue.”243
This new test would have its foundation in the Supreme Court’s holdings that anonymous
speech is protected under the First Amendment.244 Likewise the U.S. Supreme Court’s
discussion of the importance of anonymous speech has made in shaping the United States’
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history, particularly the history surrounding the ratification of the Constitution, underscores the
importance anonymous speech in American discourse.245 Only the Dendrite balancing test
provides an actual step that takes into account the importance of anonymous speech.246
However, any balancing needs guidelines for courts.
Workplace speech regulation within the government provides a good framework for
evaluating speech rights against other concerns such as defamation plaintiffs’ rights. Unlike the
balancing in different ISP subpoena tests, the balancing used in workplace speech cases is
operationalized.247 Because of this operationalization public concern analysis should be
incorporated into lower courts’ tests for enforcement of ISP subpoenas. The U.S. Supreme Court
held that public concern speech is so important that government employees who engage in
disruptive workplace speech cannot be fired in some instances where the speech itself touches on
“matters of public concern.”248 Pickering’s analysis of “matters of public concern” speech and
its relationship to government employees provides an interesting model that can be used to create
a new test for determining when an ISP must disclose the identity of its users to defamation
plaintiffs.249
In Pickering v. Board of Education the U.S. Supreme Court devised a two-part test used
to determine when a government employee could be fired from their job because of disruptive
speech.250 The first part of this test determines whether the speech focuses on “matters of public
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concern.”251 If the speech is touches on “matters of public concern,” the second part of the test is
a balancing of the value of the speech against the government’s interest in preserving
“efficiency” within the office.252 The Court addressed the balancing of untrue speech in this
equation.253 In discussing false statements made by government employees, the U.S. Supreme
Court focused on the effects of the speech on the workplace more than the falsity itself.254
Writing for the majority Justice Marshall held that “matters of public concern” was so important
under the First Amendment that even government employees’ criticism of their employers can
sometimes be protected.255
The protection of “matters of public concern” was revisited by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Connick v. Myers.256 Justice White, writing for the majority, reiterated the principles of the
Pickering balancing test and the role of “matters of public concern.”257 When speech is not
considered a “matter of public concern” by the courts there is no need for any balancing and an
employee’s termination is not afforded Pickering analysis.258 However, in order to determine if
an employee’s speech is a “matter of public concern” the Court uses “the content, form, and
context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”259 While neither Pickering nor
Connick provide a concrete explanation of what “matters of public concern” are, it is evident by

Id. at 568.
Id. at 568.
253
Id. at 570.
254
Id.
255
Id. at 574.
256
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145-147. The lawsuit in Connick concerned an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans
who circulated a questionnaire within the District Attorney’s Office that focused on problems within the office and
issues that directly related to grievances by this particular Assistant District Attorney. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
138, 140-141 (1983).
257
Id. at 145-147.
258
Id. at 146
259
Id. at 147-148. In Connick the Court held that many questions in the Assistant District Attorney’s questionnaire
did not constitute speech that was a “matter of public concern.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-149 (1983).
The Court focused on the fact that many of the questions within the questionnaire were focused on the disgruntled
Assistant District Attorney’s own personal issues with her office and “gather ammunition for another round of
controversy with her superiors.” Id. at 148.
251
252

33

these cases that it is essentially self-defining.260 As the case in Connick illustrates speech taken
as a whole can contain both a “matter of public concern” and other types of speech that are not
afforded First Amendment protection.261 However, Connick holds that finding that speech is a
“matter of public concern” is only the first part of the analysis.262 After determining speech is
about “matters of public concern” that speech is weighed against the employer’s interests in
office efficiency; and, as in Connick, employees speaking on “matters of public concern” can
still be Constitutionally fired from their government jobs.263
This article’s proposed “Anonymous Public Concern Test” incorporates the U.S. Supreme
Court’s view of protection for anonymous speech and public concern in its three-part analyses
for evaluating ISP subpoenas. Borrowing from the standards of Pickering and Connick, courts
should (1) evaluate whether the anonymous online speech at issues touches on “matters of public
concern.”264 If the online speech meets this first test then the court then (2) determines whether
the plaintiff’s need to know the defendant’s identity substantially outweighs the defendant’s right
to anonymity. If the court determines the plaintiff’s interest substantially outweighs the
speaker’s anonymity rights the court (3) evaluates the plaintiff’s claim using the “good faith” test
outlined by the Virginia Circuit Court in AOL.265 It is important to note that if the Court
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determines that the anonymous speech does not qualify as “matters of public concern” the court
skips the second step and goes straight to the AOL test.266
A. An Analysis of the “Anonymous Public Concern Test”
This next section takes this proposed test and analyzes each part in order to demonstrate how
courts would apply it in real-world situations. After each of these elements are discussed, the
“Anonymous Public Concern Test” will be applied to the online statements made by anonymous
bloggers in Cahill.267 Through this analysis this new test will be shown to protect anonymous
speakers’ rights as well as placing reasonable requirements on defamation plaintiffs.
Step 1. “Matters of Public Concern”268
This part of the test serves to protect important online commentary that may take the form of
high value political speech. Conversely, this analysis helps to weed-out unprotected defamatory
speech. If the court were to determine the speech was not “matters of public concern” then the
speech would skip the balancing test and go straight to the Step 3 AOL test.269
It is important for courts to have standards in determining what are “matters of public
concern.”270 As the U.S. Supreme Court held in Connick, “matters of public concern” are
determining by the “content, form and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole
record.”271 The U.S. Supreme Court gave further guidance on what constitutes public concern
holding that “public concern is something that is a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a
subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of publication.”272
For the purposes of determining if a comment addresses “matters of public concern” this
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proposed test would not allow a plaintiff to separate out individual phrases from a speaker’s
overall message.273 In utilizing this method, courts should look to the overall message of the
commentary. If the overall message is one that is constitutes “matters of public concern” then
the court should go through the Step 2 balancing and Step 3 AOL analysis.274 While this
proposed method not separating defamatory statements from the whole message may seem
unduly harsh to plaintiffs it serves the practical function of judicial economy. The nature of
online statements is different than those of the written word. Since online writers oftentimes
write without much editing or pre-writing it is appropriate to analyze commentary as a whole,
rather than individual statements. Since mixed messages still would go through balancing and
the AOL test, this method would not necessarily allow defamatory speech to go unpunished.275
Step 2. Balancing Speakers’ and Plaintiffs’ Rights
If the online speech in question is determined to be “matters of public concern,” the court
then balances the anonymous speaker’s interest in remaining unidentified against the plaintiff’s
interest in discovering the speaker’s true identity.276 This balancing is a crucial part of this new
test. This element is modeled on the balancing found in the Dendrite test.277 However, unlike
Dendrite, this balancing is operationalized and does not occur after a court makes the
determination of whether a plaintiff has a legitimate defamation claim.278 This
operationalization is important because it remedies the unpredictability of other tests as well as
provides courts with some rubric in analyzing anonymous speakers’ and defamation plaintiffs’
rights. It is essential to establish a standard for courts to follow in balancing. Balancing in

Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
Id. at 568; AOL, 2000 WL 1210372 at *8.
275
AOL, 2000 WL 1210372 at *8.
276
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
277
Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 142.
278
Id.
273
274

36

general is crucial to ISP subpoenas because it provides a protection for anonymous speech. The
balancing permits the courts the ability to quickly identify truly frivolous defamation claims as
well as baseless assertions for the preservation of anonymity for online speakers. Providing a
framework in which courts conduct this balancing also allows for consistency in the courts.
Designing a test in which a court balances the anonymous speaker’s and plaintiff’s interest
early on also provides for judicial economy. Unlike other tests which rely on implicit balancing
such as Cahill or balancing after the fact such as Dendrite, this initial balancing allows courts to
directly grapple with the issues of a speaker’s right to remain anonymous in light of the
plaintiff’s defamation allegations.279 It is important for judges to address these issues of
anonymous speech rights directly given the history of anonymous speech and the importance the
U.S. Supreme Court has given it in Talley and McIntyre.280
The standard for balancing these interests will be the “exacting scrutiny” standard.281 The
U.S. Supreme Court in McIntyre held that “exacting scrutiny” meant that government action
must be “narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest.”282 In Citizens United the U.S.
Supreme Court held “‘exacting scrutiny’ requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest.”283 This standard was created
to present a high hurdle for government action against anonymous speech. While not impossible
to overcome, a government entity, such as a trial court enforcing an ISP subpoena, must analyze
the important interests of anonymous speakers.
The interests of a defamation plaintiff are evident. Plaintiffs’ interests are seeking a remedy
for online libel and clearing their besmirched names. However, the interests of anonymous
Dendrite, 342 N.J. Super. at 142; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65; McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358-371.
281
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347.
282
Id. at 347.
283
Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914.
279
280

37

speakers vary. First, there is the interest in engaging in dialog about important political issues
that could otherwise be silenced. Second, there is the interest of speaking freely in an open
dialog about issues that are true concerns of society. Third, and perhaps most important, is the
interest in speaking on a subject without the fear of reprisal. It was this interest the U.S.
Supreme Court first addressed this concern in NAACP, and it is this issue that leads to the
concerns of chilling effects on anonymous speech.284 These interests of anonymous speakers
must be taken into account by the courts engaging in this balancing. These issues are important
to preserving the integrity of anonymous speech and therefore should be the main factors courts
analyze in this new balancing test.
Courts can include other factors within their analysis. For instance, the amount of attention
an online posting has received, where the posting was located on the Internet, and the public
figure/private citizen status of the plaintiff all come into courts’ balancing. While some of these
factors may be part of the plaintiff’s own determination to bring a defamation suit, they are
important for courts to consider when evaluating whether to reveal a defendant’s identity.
This balancing test does present an advantage for anonymous speakers. However, plaintiffs
can succeed in this test if they can show that the speakers’ rights are not at danger. Plaintiffs can
point to the low-value of the speech at issue; the lack of potential retribution toward other
anonymous speakers in similar situations; and the great interest the plaintiff has in clearing his or
her own name. The balancing somewhat determines just how important “matters of public
concern” are, and affords plaintiffs the right to sue for defamation on low level speech that is of
little value to the community.285
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Step 3. AOL Test286
If a plaintiff’s rights outweigh an anonymous speaker’s right to preserve their anonymity the
court then must analyze the plaintiff’s case under the AOL standard.287 This standard set forth
by the Virginia Circuit Court states a defamation plaintiff can enforce a subpoena for an
anonymous speaker’s identity:
“(1) when the court is satisfied by the pleading or evidence supplied to that court (2) that the
party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith basis to contend that it may be the
victim of conduct actionable in the jurisdiction where suit was filed and (3) the subpoenaed
identity information is centrally needed to advance that claim.”288
This standard is important for this new “Anonymous Public Concern Test” because it provides
courts the opportunity to remove truly frivolous lawsuits while simultaneously placing a low
burden on defamation plaintiffs.
This test has been criticized by the court in Cahill because it seemingly places too low a
burden on defamation plaintiffs.289 However, in the context of this new rule this test strikes the
appropriate balance. Step 1 and Step 2 of the “Anonymous Public Concern Test” are designed to
protect anonymous speech and place an extremely high hurdle for defamation plaintiffs.
However, if a plaintiff is able to meet both of these requirements, especially the balancing, then
courts should allow them to proceed under this AOL standard.290 By allowing plaintiffs to put
forth only a “legitimate, good faith basis” for a claim, most plaintiffs will be able to proceed with
enforcing a subpoena on an ISP.291
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This easy hurdle for plaintiffs does not come at the price of anonymous speech since the
balancing test rigorously defends anonymous speech. If a plaintiff gets to this stage of the
analysis there is good reason to speculate that they not only actually have more than a
“legitimate, good faith basis” for their suit, but a winnable defamation case.292 If a defamation
plaintiff gets to this stage and cannot meet the AOL requirements then their case falls into the
category of a seriously flawed lawsuit.293
B. Application of the “Anonymous Public Concern Test”
This section serves to illustrate three different types of statements this new “Anonymous
Public Concern Test” may confront. What follows is an analysis of three different statements
from the Cahill case involving anonymous online postings about Councilman Cahill.294 Each of
the comments analyzed presents a different analysis under the “Anonymous Public Concern
Test.” This analysis underscores why this proposed test is the best approach when dealing with
anonymous speakers’ and plaintiffs’ rights.
Quote 1: “If only Councilman Cahill was able to display the same leadership skills energy
and enthusiasm toward the revitalization and growth of the fine town of Smyrna as Mayor
Schaeffer has demonstrated! While Mayor Schaeffer has made great strides toward improving
the livelihood of Smyrna’s citizens, Cahill has devoted all of his energy to being a divisive
impediment to any kind of cooperative movement.”295
Application of Test:
1) Does this qualify as “matters of public concern?”296 Answer: Yes.
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This commentary deals with political issues within a local community and the political
ability of a city councilman. The subject of this speech is similar to that in Pickering in that it
deals with an important local issue, namely the capability of Councilman Cahill to serve his
constituency.297
2) Balancing Plaintiff’s Rights Against Anonymous Speaker’s Rights: Answer: The courts
balancing in this scenario should favor the anonymous speaker.
The speech at issue is political speech which is important to the community and to citizens of
Smyrna. It addresses local politics that is affecting the community and represents a citizen’s
thoughts on local issues. Most importantly if this speaker’s identity was revealed his or her
speech may be chilled. This is the type of speech that anonymity is designed to protect.
The plaintiff’s interest here is uncovering the identity of the speaker so the plaintiff can
proceed with a defamation suit. However, the commentary here is not the type that would
warrant a plaintiff trying to clear his name. Rather, it seems that a plaintiff seeking a defamation
suit in this type of case may have an interest in finding out the identity of their political foe,
which, in turn, could lead to retributive actions on the part of the plaintiff—something that would
chill this speech. This fear of retribution is more palpable in this case since this involves local
politics which is more focused on a particular community that national or even state politics.
The plaintiff has a relative weak interest in forcing the ISP to reveal the identity of the
anonymous speaker. Conversely, the anonymous speaker has great interest in preserving their
identity, especially given the nature of the speech. Therefore the balancing in this case favors the
anonymous speaker and the ISP will not be forced to reveal the identity of the online blogger.
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3) AOL Test298: Answer: No application of the AOL test since the defendant speaker’s right to
remain anonymous outweighs the plaintiff’s right to uncover the defendant’s identity in Step
2.299
If for some reason the court balanced this speech in favor of the plaintiff and AOL was applied
the plaintiff would probably still fail.300 Given that the speech in question is political opinion it
would be difficult for the plaintiff to put forth a “good faith” claim.301 This demonstrates how
this extra layer of analysis still protects the anonymous speaker.
Quote 2: “You’re right about Cahill’s wife. Word is she left him…couldn’t have sex because he
has Hepititis [sic] C. Now she’s living in Dover with her BIG blond girlfriend and they both go
out to the bars most nights trying to pick up guys. I saw her the [sic] out the other night trying to
pick up some guys. The guy was so drink [sic] he didn’t even know how…looking [sic] she was
and they left together.”302
Application of Test:
1) Does this qualify as “matters of public concern?”303 Answer: No.
This commentary is entirely personal in nature and concerns the Councilman’s marriage and
relationship with his wife. The information concerning the Councilman having Hepatitis C is
private and does not concern a matter related to his role as a politician. While this posting may
be interesting to some readers for the sensational comments made, this does not rise to the level
of public concern. The Court should skip the balancing step and go straight to the AOL test.304
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2) Balancing Plaintiff’s Rights Against Anonymous Speaker’s Rights: Answer: No
balancing necessary since the statements do not meet the requirements of “matters of
public concern.”305
Even if this court did find that the information in this comment was “matters of public
concern” the balancing would still favor the plaintiff.306 The defendant’s comments are not those
that are of interest to the community, nor is there a risk that the anonymous speaker would be
subjected to retribution. The plaintiff has a strong interest in clearing his name; and this lawsuit
is probably motivated by that goal. The state has an “overriding state interest” in this situation
since they would want to enforce a subpoena in a case where there was clearly malicious
defamation not motivated by any important political or community concern.307
3) AOL Test308: Answer: The test favors the plaintiff.
The statements at issue would qualify for a “good faith basis” for a defamation claim under
AOL.309 The statements at issue are derogatory and personal in nature. This is an example of
how this “Anonymous Public Concern Test” would not provide any protection for true
defamation by anonymous speakers. In this scenario the ISP would be required to reveal the
names of the anonymous online speakers.
Quote 3: “Anyone who has spent any amount of time with Cahill would be keenly aware of such
character flaws, not to mention an obvious mental deterioration. Cahill is a prime example of
failed leadership his eventual ousting is exactly what Smyrna needs in order to move forward
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and establish a community that is able to thrive on economic stability and common pride in its
town.”310
Application of Test:
1) Does this qualify as “matters of public concern?”311 Answer: Yes.
This commentary speaks largely to the ability of Councilman Cahill to perform his political
duties. It speaks directly to his service as a politician and public servant to the community.
However, unlike the commentary in Quote 1 this comment does include a personal statement
concerning the mental health of the councilman. This speech addresses “matters of public
concern” since he is a public official.312 However, unlike the pure political speech found in
Quote 1, this comment is potentially defamatory. Additionally this postings regarding the
Councilman’s inability to serve seems to be predicated upon this belief of his failing mental
health.
2) Balancing Plaintiff’s Rights Against Anonymous Speaker’s Rights: Answer: This is a
closer call, but this should favor the defendant.
In examining the comments in this quotation it is clear that the speaker is addressing
concerns over the Councilman’s abilities as a politician. The public may be interested in these
facts and this information may be important for the community at large. The potential chilling
effect that exposing the true identity of the speaker is similar to that in Quote 1.313
The speaker’s commentary concerning the Councilman’s mental health presents potential
defamation issues. The plaintiff would argue that he has an interest in discovering the identity of
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this speaker in order for the plaintiff to clear his name. Stating that a politician is mentally ill is
different than stating that he is politically inept.
However, since this quotation deals with as assertion regarding the mental health of the
Councilman there is a potential “overriding state interest” here in revealing the identity of the
speaker.314 Mental health of public officials is a matter that should be important to the public.
This is a different scenario than saying that a private individual is mentally ill, or even a wellknown celebrity, is mentally ill. Mental illness in a political figure is public interest and public
concern. This goes to the ability of an individual to serve his or her community and perform
their job satisfactorily. Therefore, in this analysis the plaintiff’s interests should be outweighed
by the defendant’s right to speak anonymously.
AOL Test315: Answer: Another close call, but the defendant should prevail.
Like the balancing test mentioned above, the AOL test presents a closer call. In this
particular case the court should not have to reach this level of analysis because the defendant’s
interest in anonymous speech does outweigh the plaintiff’s interest. The plaintiff in this test
would focus on the mental health commentary and show that this made qualify as a “good faith”
defamation claim under the AOL standard.316 The court, however, should focus on the plaintiff’s
status as a politician and argue that this commentary is the type that politicians are regularly
subjected to. This political position of the plaintiff would illustrate that this is not a regular
defamation claim. This is a claim made by a politician in relation to an issue that, if true, is a
major public interest. As mentioned above the court in this case should not even reach this step.
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Conclusion
Anonymous speech has been important to the development of the United States Constitution
and is important today.317 However, neither anonymous speakers nor defamation plaintiffs
should be given free rein in our legal system. In enforcing ISP subpoenas courts must strive to
strike a balance between these two interests and achieve a just result that values plaintiffs’ rights
to sue and anonymous bloggers’ right to speak. While both federal and state courts in the U.S.
have tried to grapple with this problem none have created a workable solution that treats
plaintiffs and speakers equally. The “Anonymous Public Concern Test” best addresses this
problem and should be utilized by courts.
This issue of anonymous speech does not stop with online defamation suits and ISP
subpoenas. As the Internet grows into a large space for public discourse other issues have and
will arise. Perhaps the rubric set forth in this study can provide some structural guidance in how
courts should address these problems. Further research is needed in areas concerning
anonymous online postings in criminal cases and by third party witnesses. Both of these topics
illustrate how wide anonymous speech’s impact goes and the types of difficult situations courts
find themselves in.
Additionally, more research needs to be produced in refining the balancing of anonymous
speakers’ rights verses those of defamation plaintiffs. Courts need to have a more systemized
approach in evaluating these issues. This study seeks to address some of those concerns, but
there is still room for advancement in this area. As the Twenty-First Century moves on new
problems with anonymous speech will arise. Nonetheless, it is important for courts to place
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those speakers’ rights in the same category as the anonymous speech that first supported the First
Amendment and Constitution.318
Incorporating public concern in to the analysis of ISP subpoena enforcement is an ideal
method of protecting important online speech. The biggest issue with any speech regulation is
the potential chilling effect. Online defamation suits run the risk of creating a situation where
legitimate commentary on the Internet is silenced by offended plaintiffs who are sensitive to any
perceived criticism. This new test protects important anonymous online speech while not
allowing defamation to hide behind a wide shield of protection.
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